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differences between the two main distribution channels in insurance markets (exclusive agents vs. 
independent intermediaries). The present paper uses a sample of 927 insurance intermediaries in 
Germany.  By  performing  OLS  estimations  we  test  the  impact  of  the  different  distribution 
channels,  but  also  of  other  factors  relating  to  the  information  processing  activities  on 
intermediaries’ service quality. Depending on the proxies used for service quality, we find mixed 
evidence  for the  “product  quality”  hypothesis  according  to  which  independent  intermediaries 
provide better service quality than exclusive agents. We find that service quality depends also to 
a  large  extent  on  the  information  gathering  and  processing  activities  of  the  individual 
intermediaries.  
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The Quality of Insurance Intermediary Services – Empirical Evidence for Germany  
1. Introduction  
There are profound information asymmetries between consumers and insurance companies in 
insurance markets. A number of institutions have evolved to mediate between consumers and 
insurance companies. In particular insurance intermediaries, like exclusive agents or insurance 
brokers, help to ease coordination and to further market transactions. They take an important 
position as match-makers between the supply and demand sides on insurance markets. On the one 
hand, they provide distribution and marketing services for insurance companies. On the other 
hand, they supply informational and advisory services for consumers. Insurance intermediaries 
assist in concluding an insurance contract by economizing on information and transaction costs. 
They provide low cost information to consumers about their risk profiles, insurance needs and 
suitable insurance products, thus reducing complexity for consumers.  
However,  while  insurance  intermediaries  contribute  to  enhancing  transparency  in  insurance 
markets,  the  market  for  insurance  intermediaries  is  itself  characterized  by  information  lags. 
Consumers  act  under  incomplete  and  asymmetric  information  about  the  quality  of  the 
information and advisory services provided by insurance intermediaries. These services are itself 
experience  and  credence  goods.  A  consumer  cannot  assess  the  service  quality  provided  by 
competing insurance intermediaries in advance, but only after information and advice have been 
“consumed”.  However,  even this is often  barely  possible.  Especially  for  long-term  insurance 
products like old-age or disability insurance, the quality of the information and advice given can 
be evaluated only after the insured risk has actually occurred – which often takes place decades 
later. Common business practices that have evolved over time add to the lack of transparency. 
This  holds  true  in  particular  for  remuneration  practices  and  disclosure  requirements  about 
business relations between intermediaries and insurance companies. Consequently, consumers 
have only very restricted information about potential conflicts of interest and potential bias in the 
information and advice given by insurance intermediaries.  
That  insurance  intermediaries  indeed  use  these  asymmetries  to  provide  misleading  and 
incomplete information to the detriments of consumers has been experienced in the UK in the 
1990s on a wide scale (Davis 2004). In 1997 the British government started to pay billions of  
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British pounds to compensate millions of employees who had opted out of occupational pension 
schemes because of bad advice given by financial intermediaries.  
Private insurance against the risks of longevity, illness or disability becomes more important also 
in  countries  with  rather  comprehensive  social  security  systems  because  of  the  demographic 
changes ahead and because of financial pressure to reduce social security costs which arise from 
globalization. In addition, the introduction of a common insurance market in the EU in 1994 has 
led to fundamental changes in national insurance markets. By applying a liberal approach in 
regulating  the  insurance  industry,  countries  like  Germany  or  France  introduced  extensive 
deregulations in their formerly strictly regulated insurance markets. Although there are still no 
truly integrated EU-wide insurance markets, there is, nevertheless, more competition within the 
individual markets both with respect to prices and to product differentiation. Increasing product 
heterogeneity has two conflicting effects. On the one hand, it allows consumers to find products, 
which better match their preferences, thus increasing consumer welfare. On the other hand, it 
reduces  market  transparency,  which  may  allow  insurance  companies  to  realize  monopolistic 
profits.  In  this  respect  it  decreases  consumer  welfare.  Thus,  taken  together  insurance 
intermediaries have become more important.  
In this paper we try to shed some more light on the question of the service quality provided by 
insurance intermediaries. It is based on a sample of 927 German exclusive agents, independent 
agents and insurance brokers, which was carried out in 2001.  
Insurance companies use multiple distribution channels to sell their products. The most important 
ones are exclusive agents, independent agents, insurance brokers and – for some years now – 
banks which also started to distribute insurance products. In Germany, direct purchasing through 
the  internet  also  shows  a  growing,  but  still  relative  small  share  in  selling  insurance.  While 
exclusive agents accounted for (estimated) 80% market share in 1985,  they  realized a  rather 
strong decline  to  27%  in  2005 in  the  German  market for  personal  insurance (Towers  Perrin 
2007). In contrast to that, insurance brokers, who accounted for only 14% in 1985, increased their 
share to nearly 33% in 2005. Banks which had a negligible segment twenty years ago raised their 
share to nearly 25% in 2005. It is estimated that exclusive agents will be further under pressure, 
with independent agents, insurance brokers and bank assurance still gaining market shares. All in 
all, there is a tendency among insurance companies to follow a multi-channel instead of a single 
channel distribution strategy (Trigo Gamarra 2007a).   
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Given the above mentioned changes on the demand-side and in market regulation, the declining 
relevance of exclusive agents in Germany seems to indicate that other intermediaries are better 
able to meet consumers’ demand for information and related services when buying insurance. 
These empirical findings also touch the still controversial issue in the insurance literature about 
the coexistence of multiple distribution systems. There is an extensive discussion on whether 
exclusive agents and independent intermediaries provide fundamentally the same service quality 
or  not.  According  to  the  market  failure  hypothesis  their  coexistence  is  a  consequence  of 
incomplete and asymmetric information in the insurance intermediary market, which allows the 
relatively more costly independent intermediaries to survive. On the opposite, the product quality 
hypothesis states that independent intermediaries provide better product quality than exclusive 
agents so that a separating equilibrium is realized. 
We add to the existing literature on the service quality provided by different distribution channels 
in  a  number  of  ways.  Most  empirical  studies  so  far  concern  the  property-liability  insurance 
business in the US. Our data instead focus on the German market with personal lines, where old-
age provisions are of utmost importance. Besides, we explicitly use data from a survey among 
insurance intermediaries to account for differences on the service quality provided, while most of 
the empirical literature focuses on insurance companies that use different distribution channels. 
By  this  we  provide  some  insights  on  other  factors  that  explain  quality  differences  between 
intermediaries despite them belonging to a certain distribution channel. Finally, we use a different 
approach  in  how  to  measure  the  service  quality  provided  by  intermediaries.  In  this  way  we 
contribute to the literature on empirically testing for service quality in insurance intermediary 
markets.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss in more detail the relevant theoretical 
and empirical literature and derive our main hypotheses. In section 3 we describe the German 
market for insurance intermediation, our data and the estimation methods used. The estimation 
results are presented and discussed in section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
In the following we give an overview of the relevant literature which deals with the service 
quality  provided  by  insurance  intermediaries.  Based  on  a  review  of  the  main  theoretical  
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arguments and empirical findings, which employ transaction cost economics, search theory and 
principal-agent theory, we formulate four main hypotheses.  
Theoretical Insights on Insurance Intermediaries’ Service Quality 
Insurance  markets  are  characterized  by  incomplete  and  asymmetric  information  between 
insurance  companies  and  consumers  (Cummins/  Doherty  2006;  Eckardt  2007).  Due  to  the 
complexity  of  insurance  coverage  consumers  need  information  about  their  risks,  insurance 
product and contract design as well as about claims settlement, investment behavior and financial 
stability of insurance companies. Because of the long-term nature of most personal insurance, 
information must be gathered, processed and assessed repeatedly. This requires special skills and 
expert knowledge in many different areas, like insurance mathematics or contract law. Moreover, 
in order for the whole transaction to take place, other activities beyond information search must 
be carried out. Bargaining and administrative activities, which arise whenever the terms of the 
insurance contract are (re-)negotiated and/or loss settlement takes place, are the most important 
ones. Like information acquisition and assessment, these activities also require special knowledge 
and skills. Thus, they cause costs for the necessary investment and for the time spent in carrying 
them out. Taken together these costs add up to total transaction costs. On the other side, insurance 
companies  also  need  information  about  consumers’  characteristics  and  behavior  to  provide 
adequate risk coverage. These activities can be performed either personally or with the help of 
intermediaries,  who  are  specialized  in  providing  such  informational,  bargaining  and 
administrative  services.  Generally,  consumers  and  insurance  companies  will  turn  to 
intermediaries whenever intermediated exchange creates greater net gains from trade than direct 
exchange (Spulber 1999, 256–286). Intermediaries can realize such higher net gains by reducing 
transaction costs. 
Transaction  cost  theory  and  search  theory  show  that  intermediaries  help  to  economize  on 
information and search costs and also provide additional services so that total transaction costs 
decline. Thus, they explain the existence of markets for insurance intermediaries. Reasons for 
lower transaction costs of intermediated exchange are (1) coordination cost savings and positive 
network externalities, (2) absolute cost advantages because of division of labor, specialization 
and learning effects over time as well as (3) economies of scale and scope with respect to the 
fixed costs of a transaction (Rose 1999, 58–66; Spulber 1999, 262–266). Coordination costs are 
lower in intermediated than in direct exchange since the number of contacts between potential  
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trading partners is reduced. By involving an intermediary, the number of marketing channels is 
reduced due to the fixed costs associated with coordinating potential trading partners. This leads 
to further cost reductions because of the increasing returns realized. Above that, there are also 
positive  network  externalities  if  the  intermediary  acts  as  a  communication  center  (Baligh-
Richartz  effect,  Rose  1999,  60).  Besides,  transaction  cost  reductions  result  from  higher 
productivity as a consequence of specialization and division of labor, learning effects over time 
and economies of scale and scope. Whereas in direct exchange consumers perform the activities 
related to the insurance transaction only for this particular transaction, intermediaries in insurance 
markets perform these activities more frequently and for a higher volume of transactions. In this 
manner gains can be realized by assisting in searching and matching, negotiating, monitoring, 
and executing insurance transactions. While a single consumer uses investment in human capital, 
search technologies or expertise to increase the productivity of transactional activities only for the 
transaction  at  hand,  an  intermediary  can  repeatedly  use  the  same  information.  In  this  way, 
economies of scale and scope are obtained. All in all, intermediaries in insurance markets can 
improve  market  transparency  between  the  two  market sides  at  lower  costs  than  under  direct 
exchange (see Table 1). 
Table 1  Transaction Cost Reductions from Intermediation 
Transaction Stages  Intermediary Service  Cost Reduction  
Searching and matching · direct sales of information 
· matchmaking 
· market-making 
· search costs 
· information costs 
· opportunity costs of time 
Availability of products 
and immediacy 
· compensation of variances in demand and 
supply 
· opportunity costs of time 
Negotiating and  
Contracting 
· strong bargaining position 
· exploitation of differences in contract terms 
between supply and demand market side 
· to standardize contracts 
· negotiation costs 
· information costs 
· administrative costs 
· opportunity costs of time 
Monitoring and  
Guaranteeing 
· expertise in determining product and 
service quality 
· cross-sectional and temporal reuse of 
information 
· guaranteeing high product quality 
· information costs 
· monitoring and control costs 
· costs resulting from uncertainty 
· investment in expertise 
 
Source: Following Rose (1999, 65, Table 6). 
From search theory a number of factors that affect the service quality provided by insurance 
intermediaries can be identified (Posey/ Yavas 1995; Posey/ Tennyson 1998; Seog 1999, 2005;  
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Eckardt  2007).  On  the  demand  side,  consumers’  preferences  in  regard  to  insurance  related 
information and other transaction services and their transaction costs influence their make-or-buy 
decision.  Besides,  many  information  services  depend  on  privately  held  information  by 
consumers.  Thus  intermediation  service  quality  depends  also  on  the  collaboration  between 
consumers and intermediaries. On the supply side, the distribution of the relevant information as 
well as the search technology used are important factors that affect the search costs which have to 
be incurred for producing information and other services of a certain quality level (Rose 1999; 
Eckardt 2007). Most important inputs are the time spent for searching, processing and evaluating 
information and investment in specific insurance-related human capital (knowledge and skills).  
Insurance  intermediaries  differ  by  their  legal  status.  Exclusive  insurance  agents  represent 
exclusively the products of a single insurance company, whereas joint or independent insurance 
agents sell policies of different insurance companies, but normally for each line of insurance only 
from one insurance company.  Opposed to the latter, insurance brokers are independent from 
insurance companies and principally distribute all insurance products available on the market. In 
the US, independent agents and insurance brokers own the client list, while in case of exclusive 
agents  the  insurance  company  decides  on  contract  renewal.  In  contrast  to  that,  in  Germany 
insurance  companies  own  the  client  list  in  any  case,  even  when  insurance  is  distributed  by 
independent agents and insurance brokers (Zinnert/ Griess 1997). Nevertheless, also in Germany 
independent intermediaries are legally required to provide more comprehensive information than 
exclusive agents to their customers, otherwise they might encounter legal sanctions. Despite these 
differences, the various types of intermediaries nevertheless compete for the same consumers, in 
particular,  if  they  distribute  personal  lines  (Cummins/  Doherty  2006).
3  Barriers  to  entry  are 
usually low in the local or regional markets served by insurance intermediary firms. Insurance 
intermediaries  are  remunerated  by  commissions  paid  directly  by  insurance companies.  These 
commissions are a percentage of the premiums sold to consumer.
4 Since consumers act either 
under a “free price”-illusion or simply do not know about what percentage of the premiums they 
pay  go to  insurance  intermediaries,  price  competition  is  quasi  not  existent  in  the market  for 
                                                 
3   Note that in this paper we are not concerned with bigger insurance brokerage firms which are specialized in 
commercial insurance lines and act on a national or international basis (Cummins/ Doherty 2006).  
4   There are also so-called contingent premiums which are independent of premiums. But they account only for a 
rather small amount of intermediaries’ total revenues (Cummins/Doherty 2006).  
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insurance intermediation (Cummins/ Doherty 2006). Thus, insurance intermediary markets are 
characterized by monopolistic competition (Cummins/ Doherty 2006; Eckardt 2007). Insurance 
intermediaries compete for customers both by horizontal and vertical product differentiation. In 
the former case they offer different  kinds of services, while in the latter they offer different 
quality levels.  
Insurance  intermediary  markets  are  also  characterized  by  incomplete  and  asymmetric 
information. Information and counseling services on complex and long-term insurance purchase 
decisions  are  experience  and  credence  goods  (Nelson  1970;  Darby/  Karni  1973;  Hirshleifer 
1973).  According  to  principal-agent  theory  this  information  asymmetry  leads  to  low  quality 
provision due to differing objectives between principals and agents. Consumers  as principals 
have only incomplete information about an intermediary’s (= agent’s) characteristics, knowledge 
and experience before contract conclusion as well as about the intermediary’s proper intentions 
and  actions  after  contract  conclusion.  Therefore  the  performance  of  the  agent  can  be  only 
incompletely  assessed  by  the  principal.  She  cannot  correctly  assess  whether  a  particular 
performance is the proper result of the contractually agreed efforts of the agent under the given 
circumstances or the  consequence of a contract violation. Since not all contingencies can be 
explicitly specified ex ante, there are incomplete contracts. Therefore contract fulfillment can be 
only incompletely enforced by courts ex post as well. As a consequence of the agent’s privately 
held information, adverse selection and/ or moral hazard may occur. Accordingly, no separating 
equilibrium  should  occur,  leading  to  overall  low  service  quality  in  the  market  for  insurance 
intermediation (Gravelle 1993; Horsch 2004; Kurland 1995, 1996).  
Along these lines of reasoning, there is an extensive literature which analyzes the coexistence of 
insurance  distribution  by  exclusive  versus  independent  intermediaries  from  an  agency  or 
transaction  cost  perspective  (Berger/  Cummins/  Weiss  1997;  Regan/  Tennyson  2000).  It  has 
provoked  a  vivid  discussion  as  to  whether  the  persistence  of  independent  agent  distribution 
systems  results  from  profound  inefficiencies  in  the  insurance  market  (market  imperfection 
hypothesis) or whether it is based on specific services provided by independent agents (product 
quality hypothesis) (Berger/ Cummins/ Weiss 1997). Authors supporting the latter hypothesis 
argue  that  independent  intermediaries  are  legally  seen  as  representing  the  interests  of  policy 
holders. In case of low information service quality, they could be legally sanctioned. Besides, 
since they own the client list, they can credibly threaten insurers to switch to another company.  
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Accordingly, it is stated that independent intermediaries have incentives to provide better services 
to  consumers  than  exclusive  agents  so  that  a  separating  equilibrium  arises  despite  profound 
information asymmetries. In particular, independent intermediaries seem to be of advantage in 
mitigating  agency  problems  between  shareholders  and  policyholders  which  result  from 
organizational  form  (Mayers/  Smith  1981;  Kim/  Mayers/  Smith  1996;  Regan/  Tzeng  1999; 
Baranoff/ Sager 2003). In contrast to that, vertical integration and thus reliance on exclusive 
agents seems to be more profitable for insurance companies to induce a high level of sales efforts 
from  agents  (Sass/  Gisser  1989).  The  same  holds  when  insurers  rely  heavily  on  advertising 
(Marvel 1982, Grossmann/ Hart 1986) or on relation-specific investment (Regan 1997).  
Empirical Findings on Service Quality  
Most of the empirical studies carried out to test for the market imperfection vs. product quality 
hypothesis show a clear cost advantage of direct writers compared to independent agent insurers 
(Joskow 1973; Cummins/ VanDerhei 1979; Barrese/ Nelson 1992)
5. They also seem to be better 
suited than exclusive agents for tailoring insurance coverage to consumers’ needs in insurance 
lines where complexity is high and risk assessment of customers becomes more difficult (Regan/ 
Tennyson 1996; Regan 1997, Regan/ Tzeng 1999). There is mixed evidence whether independent 
agents  or  brokers  offer  better  service  quality  as  measured  by  claims  settlement  data  than 
exclusive  agents  (Doerpinghaus  1991;  Barrese/  Doerpinghaus/  Nelson  1995).  There  is  also 
evidence for the US market that independent agents are less beneficial for larger insurance firms 
and larger market size and for those in which long-term relations are valued (Berger/ Cummins/ 
Weiss 1997; Regan/ Tennyson 1996, 2000; Regan 1997; Regan/ Tzeng 1999).
6  
These studies do not explicitly deal with the service quality provided by single intermediaries, but 
concentrate on differences in the relative efficiency of insurance companies that use different 
distribution systems. They focus primarily on the US insurance market, in particular regarding 
property-liability insurance. The units of analysis are not insurance intermediaries, but insurance 
companies. The impact of exclusive versus independent intermediaries on insurance companies’ 
                                                 
5   However, see Trigo Gamarra (2007a) who finds for the German life insurance industry no cost advantage of 
direct insurers compared to multi-channel insurers. Independent agents show both lower cost efficiency and 
lower profit efficiency than multi-channel insurers.  
6   Besides findings are not uniform when analyzing whether independent intermediaries are more advantage in 
mitigating agency problems. While there are positive results for the US (Kim/ Mayers/ Smith 1996; Regan/ 
Tzeng 1999; Baranoff/ Sager 2003), Ward (2003) finds just the contrary for the UK.  
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performance is analyzed by including a dummy variable which accounts for the main distribution 
channel  used.  Therefore  these  studies  do  not  allow  any  statements  about  quality  differences 
between  single  intermediaries  belonging  to  the  same  distribution  channel  nor  on  the  factors 
affecting such differences.  
There are only very few econometric papers that study more comprehensively the service quality 
provided by single insurance intermediaries. The findings of Etgar (1976) do not support the 
hypothesis that independent agents provide overall better service quality than exclusive agents. 
They are significantly more active in claims settlement than exclusive agents, but there is mixed 
evidence on their service quality regarding assistance in risk analysis and in placing insurance 
applications.  Cummins/  Weisbart  (1977)  obtain  similar  results  in  a  study  on  insurance 
intermediaries, which operate in three different US states in personal insurance lines.  Again, 
independent agents are found to provide better claims settlement services and to review coverage 
more often, while they provide less service quality than exclusive agents in other dimensions. 
Eckardt (2002) provides a study based on German exclusive agents and insurance brokers, who 
are  mainly  engaged  in  personal  lines.  Mean  differences  parametric  tests  reveal  a  number  of 
highly  significant  differences  in  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  variables  that  support  the 
product quality hypothesis. This is in line with the findings of Trigo Gamarra (2007b). For a 
sample of exclusive and independent intermediaries active in the German life insurance industry 
she finds evidence that supports the product quality hypothesis. According to her results, the 
independent  intermediaries  show  higher  service  quality  than  exclusive  agents  in  regard  to  a 
number of different input- and output indicators, which measure service quality and performance. 
Like the product quality hypothesis states, service quality increases with the share of complex 
insurance products in  an intermediary’s portfolio and with the  number  of additional services 
provided. 
Hypotheses 
All in all, there is mixed empirical evidence in regard to the product quality hypothesis. No 
conclusions  can  be  drawn  on  other  factors  affecting  service  quality  differences  between 
intermediaries. Thus, from the above discussion of transaction cost, search and principal agent 
theory we draw the following hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 states that independent intermediaries 
provide  better  service  quality  than  exclusive  agents  (product  quality  hypothesis).  From 
principal  agent  theory  it  follows  that  a  separating  equilibrium  between  intermediaries  with  
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different service quality emerges, if credible signals are given. Since insurance brokers can be 
legally  sanctioned  when  not  providing  a  certain  (high)  level  of  service  quality,  being  an 
independent intermediary should be such a credible signal, implying better service quality than it 
is  provided  by  exclusive  agents.  Besides,  principal  agent  theory  states  that  the  lower  the 
information asymmetries between principals and agents are, the better the product quality should 
be.  Accordingly  we  contend  that  the  better  customers’  knowledge  about  insurance  relevant 
matters is, the higher the service quality provided should be. 
In contrast to hypothesis 1, the following hypotheses 2 to 4  analyze a number of additional 
factors that might explain quality differences between intermediaries, independent of their legal 
status.  
Hypothesis 2 states that specialization, economies of scale and scope should have a positive 
impact on the service quality provided by an intermediary. From transaction cost economics and 
search theory it is derived that specialization and economies of scale reduce search costs for 
producing a particular quality level of service quality. With an increase in firm size insurance 
intermediaries can specialize in certain informational processing activities as well as in providing 
additional  services.  Thus,  with  an  increase  in  employees,  an  intermediary  firm  can  realize 
economies  of  scale.  Besides,  there  might  also  be  positive  effects  due  to  specializing  on  the 
products of a certain insurance company as well as on a certain line of insurance or on particular 
customer segments. In each case, specific information about a particular insurance company and 
her products, about a particular insurance line or about the particular risks and insurance needs of 
a certain customer segment can be used more often, once gathered by a specialized insurance 
intermediary compared to a non-specialized one. In addition, by providing additional insurance-
related services like financial counseling or claims settlement an intermediary can gain additional 
information  about  customers’  needs  and  preferences  as  well  as  about  insurance  companies’ 
products and behavior. If such information is used in giving advice and counseling, information 
and service quality is increased by reducing the underlying information asymmetries consumers 
and insurance companies. Thus, additional services might entail economies of scope. 
Hypothesis 3 states that the more efforts are spent by an intermediary on producing information 
services, the higher the service quality offered. More precisely, since providing information and 
giving advice on insurance transactions requires knowledge and skills on insurance economics, 
financial markets, social security and contract law to name just a few. In line with the theory it is  
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contended that the higher investment in insurance-relevant knowledge and skills is, the better the 
information  gathered  in  the  search  process  by  an  intermediary  will  be  processed,  eventually 
resulting in better service quality. Besides, we contend that the more time is spent on searching 
and processing information and on counseling customers, the higher the service quality provided 
by  intermediaries  is,  independent  of  whether  they  are  exclusive  agents  or  independent 
intermediaries.  According  to  search  theory  the  larger  the  proportion  of  time  devoted  to 
information acquisition and processing or to counseling interviews is, the more information about 
insurance products and their characteristics as well as about the specific needs of the clients can 
be gathered and the higher the information quality would be.  
Finally, hypothesis 4 takes into account that the service quality provided by an intermediary also 
depends positively on the quality of the informational input. From search theory we derive that 
the  quality  of  the  information  gained  in  search  depends  on  the  quality  of  the  underlying 
information sources. The better these are and the better the acquired information is, the higher the 
service quality. In addition, from principal agent theory we derive that the quality of advice given 
by an intermediary also relies on privately held information by customers. Thus, we contend that 
the better the cooperation between the customer and the intermediary,  the higher the service 
quality provided by the latter should be.  
Thus, we test the following hypotheses:  
H 1 -  Product Quality Hypothesis: Independent intermediaries provide better service quality. 
H 2 -  Specialization, Economies of Scale and Scope: Specialization and economies of scale and 
scope lead to better service quality. 
H 3 -  Efforts Spend: The more an intermediary invests in general and insurance-specific human 
capital (knowledge and skills) and the more time an intermediary spends on information 
processing and counseling interviews, the better the service quality provided. 
H 4 -  Informational Input: The better the information sources used by an intermediary are, the 
more  information  about  relevant  subjects  an  intermediary  provides  in  counseling 
interviews and the more consumers’ cooperate, the better is the service quality provided. 
Table A.1 in the Appendix summarizes the hypotheses to be tested, the independent variables and 
the expected relations. Hypothesis H 1 tests for the product quality hypothesis, while hypotheses  
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H 2 to H 4 refer to additional factors that affect the quality of the services provided by insurance 
intermediaries.  
3. Data and Estimation Methods 
The German Market for Insurance Intermediation 
The German market for insurance intermediaries was widely unregulated until 2007 (Mauntel 
2004;  Rehberg  2003).
7  There  were  no  formal  entry  restrictions  other  than  having  a  trading 
license. To get such a license from the Trade Supervisory Office (Gewerbeaufsichtsamt) required 
only having a certificate issued by the police stating that the holder had no criminal record. No 
registration, financial skills or financial guarantees were mandatory. Conduct regulation was also 
very  weak.  Exclusive  agents  differ  from  independent  intermediaries  regarding  the  legal 
responsibilities in regard to the  kind and amount of information provided to  consumers.  For 
exclusive  agents  the  respective  insurance  companies  are  held  responsible  in  case  an  agent 
provides false or misleading information about policy benefits, terms and conditions, dividends 
or premiums. To independent intermediaries more strict liability rules in case of professional 
negligence  apply.  Nevertheless,  professional  indemnity  insurance  was  not  compulsory. 
Disclosure regulations were of a rather general nature as well. It was neither prescribed in detail 
what information had to be passed to consumers, nor in what form had this to be done. Besides it 
was customary that consumers were not informed on the commission and fees intermediaries 
received as part of the insurance premiums for their services. Therefore, they can be said to have 
acted under a “free fee” illusion. As a consequence there was no price competition in the German 
market for insurance intermediaries. Finally, there was a general ban on rebating commissions 
both  for  insurance  agents  and  brokers.  That  is,  for  insurance  intermediaries,  resale  price 
maintenance was legally sanctioned. 
Our data is obtained from a survey among 4,687 self-employed German insurance intermediaries, 
which was carried out in autumn 2001. The addresses of the interviewees were randomly chosen 
from online directories and from the yellow pages. 927 insurance intermediaries answered the 
                                                 
7   Because of reforms of the German insurance law and the implementation on the EU Directive on Insurance 
Intermediation now stricter rules apply to insurance intermediaries. But these new rules are of no importance for 
the following analysis, since our survey was carried out in 2001.  
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questionnaire, implying a response rate of 20%.
8 Among the respondents 423 are self-employed 
exclusive insurance agents, 504 independent intermediaries.
9 Data was collected about individual 
and  firm  characteristics  of  the  interviewed insurance  intermediaries,  the services  offered,  the 
intermediation process and general market conditions.
10   
Dependent Variables 
Insurance  intermediary  services  comprehend  mainly  information  services,  but  also  additional 
services,  like  risk  assessment,  claims  settlement  or  loss  management.  Since  services  are 
intangible, their quality cannot be measured in an objective way. Therefore, we estimate four 
different  performance  measures  in  markets  for  insurance  intermediation.  The  first  three, 
information  index,  additional  services  and  service  index  are  input-oriented,  measuring 
information  and  additional  services  provided  by  intermediaries.  The  last  one,  the  contract 
conclusion rate, is a proxy for insurance intermediaries’ economic success. It indicates whether 
providing service quality is economically profitable for insurance intermediaries. Besides, it can 
be also seen as a more subjective output-oriented indicator pointing to how content customers are 
with the service quality provided. 
The  variable  information index is a  proxy  for  the  information  quality  provided  by  insurance 
intermediaries. It is a summary indicator that captures the weight that an insurance intermediary 
attaches to 27 subjects about a customer’s need for insurance protection, insurance products and 
                                                 
8   Since there are no market data available on the service quality provided by insurance intermediaries, the optimal 
way of collecting information about insurance intermediaries’ service quality would be to conduct a high enough 
number of mystery shopping interviews and then combine them with data about the interviewed intermediaries’ 
service production activities. However, due to financial constraints this was not possible, so that a survey was 
carried out. Although this might entail committing a type II error, our sample size seems reasonably large 
enough  to  avoid  it.  The  potential  of  committing  such  an  error  can  be  further  reduced  by  increasing  the 
significance level and thus the potential of committing a type I error, since both errors are inversely related. For 
more details on this see Diekmann (2000, 585-602), Stock/ Watson (2003, 68-69). 
9   As there has been no legal duty to register for insurance intermediaries in Germany at that time, the total 
population is unknown. The sample represents the regional demographic distribution of the German population 
well (Federal Statistical Office 2004, 26). It also captures the main distribution channels, which account for two 
thirds of the total premium income gained in the German insurance market in 2001 (GDV 2002). 
10   As the pretest showed a very low willingness to answer questions to remuneration patterns, costs, turnovers, and 
profits, they were omitted from the survey. For empirical evidence on compensation schemes see Zweifel/ 
Ghermi (1990), Laslett/ Wilsdon/ Malcolm (2002) and Cummins/ Doherty (2006).  
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coverage,  policy  design  and  contract  terms.
11  Half  the  items  deal  with  the  particularities  of 
private old-age insurance. This is justified by the fact that this insurance line makes for the largest 
share of the interviewed insurance intermediaries’ income (Eckardt 2002).  For each item the 
interviewee is asked how much importance (with 1 = totally unimportant to 5 = very important) 
he  gives  to  it  in  his  counseling  interviews.  Then,  for  each  intermediary  the  mean  value  is 
calculated after summing up all 27 items. Although this input-oriented variable is concerned with 
the content of the information provided, it makes neither statements about the actual information 
provided nor whether the information provided is accurate from an objective point of view since 
participants  may  overstate  their  service  quality.  However,  response  bias  can  be  reasonably 
assumed to occur similarly for all interviewees (Etgar 1976).
12 As a consequence however, our 
focus is not on the values of the coefficient estimates reported in the regressions, but on their 
signs.  
Since  insurance  intermediaries  not  only  provide  information,  but  also  additional  transaction 
related services, we use the variable additional services, which measures how many additional 
services  are  supplied  to  consumers  besides  information  services.  Finally,  we  construct  an 
aggregate service index variable as a proxy to account for total service quality provided. For this 
we normalise the information index and the additional services variables before aggregating them 
additively. Since we assume that information services are the most important services provided 
by insurance intermediaries,
13 the information index variable enters the service index with double 
weight compared to the additional services variable.  
As  a  further  measure  we  use  the  contract  conclusion  rate  variable  as  a  proxy  for  market 
performance  and  economic  success.  It  indicates  the  percentage  of  counseling  interviews  an 
intermediary  conducts  that  on  average  result  in  consumers  actually  concluding  an  insurance 
                                                 
11   These items result inter alia from interviews with experts on consumer protection in personal insurance. For 
more details on the single items, see the variables underlying the factor analysis in Tables A.4 and A.5 in the 
Appendix. 
12   The results of the mean difference parametric tests in Eckardt (2002) indicate that there is only weak response 
bias. 
13   See  in  section  2  above  the  reasoning  of  transaction  costs  economics  and  search  theory  on  insurance 
intermediaries as information intermediaries.  
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contract.
14 It shows whether the provision of high information quality positively influences an 
intermediary’s  economic  performance.  In  addition,  this  output-oriented  variable  can  be  also 
interpreted as a more subjective indicator of the service quality provided. It indicates whether 
customers  are  satisfied  with  the  information  and  advice  given  by  an  intermediary  during  a 
counseling  interview  as  with  the  additional  services  provided.  Accordingly,  the  higher  an 
intermediary’s  contract  conclusion  rate  is,  the  better  is  her  service  quality  as  subjectively 
perceived by consumers.  
Independent Variables 
The behavior of insurance intermediaries may differ according to their (in-)dependence from 
insurance companies and because of different regulatory rules. The variable intermediary type 
distinguishes  between  the  distribution  channels  exclusive  agents  and  independent 
intermediaries.
15 Intermediaries help consumers to reduce search costs because they are assumed 
to  have  a  better  market  overview,  thus  providing  more  comprehensive  information  about  a 
number of different insurance companies and their products.  
While independent agents and brokers provide information about a number of different insurance 
companies,  exclusive  agents  however,  represent  only  a  single  insurance  company  and  its 
products.  Although  this  implies  that  they  provide  less  comprehensive  information  than 
independent intermediaries, the overall effect on the service quality might be ambiguous. By 
specializing on a particular insurance company, an intermediary can gain an in-depth knowledge 
of this particular insurance company and its products that an intermediary with a broader market 
overview  might  not  have.  To  account  for  this  potentially  offsetting  effect,  we  include  the 
variables  specialization  on  an  insurance  company  and  its  products  and  insurance  company 
reputation.  It  measures  what  weight  intermediaries  attach  to  the  insurance  company  whose 
products they distribute for gaining high reputation themselves. By this we take into account that 
specialization on a certain insurance company might be the outcome of a deliberate selection 
process. If an exclusive agent chooses to work for a high quality insurance company, he can 
benefit from its reputation and concentrate on providing in-depth information about its products.  
                                                 
14   Note that this success rate is not a profitability measure since it provides no information on the premiums of the 
contracts concluded or on the costs spent by them. 
15   Note that independent intermediaries comprehend both independent agents and insurance brokers. Accordingly 
we use these terms synonymously in the following.  
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To  further  capture  the  impact  of  specialization  effects  and  economies  of  scale  in  producing 
intermediation services, we include a number of other variables which account for firm size, 
specialization on a certain insurance line (old-age insurance) and on customer segments. The 
more specialized an insurance intermediary is in these respects, the better the information quality 
provided should be, since she can realize economies of scale. Besides, we asked for the number 
of additional services provided (additional services) to see whether there are economies of scope. 
Finally, to control for the impact of competition in the markets of insurance intermediation we 
add a variable that measures the competitive pressure. It follows from monopolistic competition 
that an increase in competition should result in a higher degree of product differentiation. In our 
case this would imply better information quality and more additional services, the higher the 
competitive pressure. 
The  questionnaire  inquired  about  human  capital  variables  as  inputs  used  for  producing 
information  and  transaction  services.  The  age  of  the  intermediary  and  investment  in  human 
capital  (formal  education,  (additional)  training,  university  degree,  work  experience,  further 
training) are proxies to account for service quality.
16 Besides, the participants were asked which 
percentage of their total time budget they spent on different activities (information acquisition 
and  processing,  counseling  interviews,  further  training,  claims  settlement,  sales  efforts). 
Furthermore, the average duration of counseling interviews in absolute terms is used to account 
for the quantitative input to service production (duration_interviews).  
The quality of the information provided depends also on the quality of the information sources 
used. To gain information about this aspect, we calculate the variable information source as the 
product of the importance of a certain information provider (like an insurance company or a 
rating agency) to an intermediary and the objectivity she attaches to it. For further trainings there 
is no variable that shows the credibility attached to it as a reliable information source. Therefore, 
source_further training indicates only the importance of this information source without making 
statements about its perceived objectivity by an intermediary. We expect that intermediaries, who 
rely strongly on more credible information sources, provide better information quality to their 
customers. 
                                                 
16   Such proxies are widely used in empirical studies on relationship lending to account for the quality of lenders 
and thus to assess the degree of asymmetric information between banks and their customers. See for example 
Berger/ Udell (1990) and Neuberger/ Raethke-Doeppner (2008).  
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To account for the information content provided, the interviewees were asked which weight they 
give to 27 different aspects in counseling interviews that are relevant from an objective point of 
view  for  consumers  to  decide  rationally  about  insurance  coverage  (see  above  information 
index).
17 It is assumed that an intermediary informs her customers more extensively about those 
aspects  to  which  she  attaches  more  weight.  Together  with  general  information,  product 
information  and  information  on  contract  design,  the  interviewees  were  questioned  about 
particular topics relevant for old-age insurance. Furthermore, as the participation in surplus is an 
important sales argument for life assurances, different items were asked about this subject to see 
how  much  weight  intermediaries  put  on  informing  consumers  about  the  components  of  the 
calculations normally used. By performing a factor analysis, seven factors were extracted which 
are used as independent variables to account for the information content provided (Tables A.4 and 
A.5  in  the  Appendix).
18  They  comprehend  information  on  personal  risk  profile  and  security 
options,  general  aspects  on  insurance,  private  old-age  insurance  products,  policy  design, 
contract design, contract execution and calculation of participation rates. 
Differences in customers’ knowledge about insurance matters can also lead to differences in the 
information quality provided, since it reduces information asymmetries between consumers and 
intermediaries.  Generally,  the  more  knowledge  consumers  have  about  insurance  relevant 
subjects, the higher the information quality of an intermediary is expected to be. Otherwise, there 
is  the  threat  that  discontent  customers  would  turn  to  another  intermediary.  Besides,  the 
production of information services is the result of a cooperative effort. Besides, the quality of the 
advice given by an intermediary also depends on information privately held by a customer. The 
more knowledge a customer has on insurance relevant matters, the less effort the intermediary 
has to spend to extract this information by the customer.  
We also  include  two  consumer  demand variables;  one  that  measures customers’  demand  for 
information services and one that accounts for their demand for additional services for free. We 
asked  whether  such  demand  of  an  intermediary’s  customers  has  increased  over  the  last  six 
                                                 
17   Since the dependent variable information index is based on the same 27 items, the following variables are only 
used as regressors on the additional services and on the contract conclusion rate variables. See models 2 and 4 
in Table 1 below. 
18  Although  factor  analysis  assumes  interval  data,  Jaccard  and  Wan  (1996,  4)  summarize  in  a  review  of  the 
literature on this topic that with ordinal Likert scale items “for many statistical tests, rather severe departures 
(from intervalness) do not seem to affect Type I and Type II errors dramatically.”   
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months. In 2001, pension reform had been high on the public agenda in Germany and had been 
widely covered in the media. To cope with the demographic changes ahead, reforms entailed the 
introduction of tax-subsidized private pensions in addition to the so far rather comprehensive 
public pension schemes. Accordingly, given the rather agitated public (and private) debates about 
the future of one’s pension entitlements, a higher demand for information services should have a 
positive impact on the information and service quality actually provided. The same holds for the 
demand for additional services.
19  Customers’ knowledge and demand variables are also proxies 
for how intense cooperation between an intermediary and his customer is. The more intense it is, 
the more privately held information consumers’ are assumed to disclose. 
Estimation Methods 
The  hypotheses  are  tested  by  using  OLS-estimations,
20  since  the  service  quality  depends 
primarily  on  supply-side  factors.  As  there  is  imperfect  and  asymmetric  information  on 
consumers’  side  about  the  true  information  quality  provided  by  intermediaries,  the  feedback 
mechanism between insurance intermediaries’ service quality and the number of consumers using 
them is strongly weakened. Accordingly, we can use OLS instead of, for example, Two-Stage-
Least-Squares  (2SLS)  estimations,  which  should  be  otherwise  applied  to  avoid  simultaneous 
equation bias.  
In addition, there are also methodological reasons for using OLS. Most importantly, we are not 
aware of any meaningful variable which could be used as an instrument in 2SLS or other related 
estimation methods.
21 Intermediaries’ services are mainly intangible goods which are produced 
by interaction. The service quality provided by an intermediary depends to a large degree on 
gaining  information  of  his  or  her  customers’  preferences,  needs,  and  risks  through 
communication.  Such  information  is  an  input  factor  in  producing  high  quality  information 
services.  Thus,  during  a  counseling  interview  an  intermediary  can  obtain  information  about 
                                                 
19   Table A.2 in the Appendix summarizes the definition and measurement of the variables. The main descriptive 
statistics of the variables are reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
20   For the assumptions of the linear OLS regression, see Greene (2000, 210-264). The estimations are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity  where  necessary.  For  multicollinearity  see  the  correlation  matrix  in  Table  A.6  in  the 
Appendix. 
21   For  this,  a  variable  should  affect  only  consumers’  demand  for  service  quality,  but  have  no  impact  on 
intermediaries’ decisions on their quality supply, that is it should be both relevant and exogenous, see Stock/ 
Watson (2003, 331-372).  
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variables that affect his customers’ demand for information quality. Because of the prevalent 
information asymmetries,  the  intermediary  can  use  this  information  to  his  own  advantage  in 
supplying  his  profit-maximizing  quality  level.  Because  all  variables  that  affect  consumers’ 
demand for service quality can be communicated in counseling interviews, therefore they also 
affect the service quality actually supplied by an intermediary. Thus, they are not exogenous and 
therefore cannot  be used as  an  instrument  in 2SLS.  Besides, we  are  not  concerned  with  the 
absolute  values  of  the  estimated  coefficients,  but  only  with  their  signs.  Finally,  we  have  no 
information on the number of consumers or the sales volume of the single intermediaries. Thus, 
form a quite practical point of view OLS is the best solution to estimate the service quality 
provided by an intermediary. 
For  the  independent  continuous  variables  age,  work  experience,  further  training_number, 
duration_interviews,  information  source,  source  further  training  and  additional  services  we 
assume that they have a positive, but decreasing effect on the service quality provided. Thus, we 
use their log in the estimated equations. For the dependent variables information index, additional 
services and service index we perform semi-log OLS-estimations. For the contract conclusion 
rate as dependent variable we apply a logistic function (Cooper/ Nakanishi 1988). This accounts 
for  the  fact  that,  when  starting  from  a  low  level,  increases  in  inputs  first  result  in 
disproportionately high and then in disproportionately low increases in the contract conclusion 
rate.  
All in all, we perform three specifications for each dependent variable. Models 1 to 4 test for the 
product quality hypothesis (hypothesis 1) and for specialization and economies of scale and scope 
(hypothesis 2), while models 5 to 8 test for the impact of the efforts spend (hypothesis 3) and of 
informational inputs (hypothesis 4). The effect of combining all hypotheses is shown in models 9 
to 12. For the variables used in each specification see Table A.1 in the Appendix. The results are 
discussed in the following section. 
4. Estimation Results and Discussion 
The empirical results of the OLS regression equations are reported in Tables 1 and 2 below. 
 
[Table 1 about here]  
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Hypothesis 1 – Product Quality Hypothesis 
The  product  quality  hypothesis  states  that  independent  intermediaries  provide  better  service 
quality than exclusive agents. According to all our models, this is confirmed when using the 
information index or the contract conclusion rate as dependent variable. Compared to being an 
independent intermediary, being an exclusive agent and, thus, more dependent from insurance 
companies has a significantly negative impact both on the information quality provided and on 
the contract conclusion rate realized. These findings confirm hypothesis 1 according to which 
information quality should be the higher the more independent intermediaries are from single 
insurance  companies.  Independent  intermediaries  provide  significantly  better  information 
services, which is also honored by customers in that they realize better market performance than 
exclusive agents.  
While these results support the product quality hypothesis, when using additional services as 
dependent  variable  we  find  quite  the  opposite  effect,  with  exclusive  agents  providing  a 
significantly higher number of additional services. This finding might be due to the particularities 
of  monopolistic  competition,  which  characterizes  the  market  for  insurance  intermediaries. 
Exclusive agents are more constrained than independent intermediaries when it comes to vertical 
product differentiation. Since they depend in regard to the number and quality of the insurance 
products they distribute on the insurance company they represent, they are more constrained in 
increasing information quality. Thus they have to rely more on horizontal product differentiation, 
i.e. on offering additional services. This finding is supported by our estimations, as the variable 
insurance company reputation has a significantly positive impact on the information quality in 
model  1,  while  it  has  a  significantly  negative  impact  on  the  number  of  additional  services 
provided  in  model  2.  Intermediaries  which  are  convinced  on  the  quality  of  the  insurance 
companies  they  represent  specialize  more  in  providing  high  quality  information services  and 
offer fewer additional services. However, this does not result in a significant increase of market 
performance as measured by the contract conclusion rate.  
Finally, when using the service index as dependent variable we find no statistically significant 
differences between exclusive agents and independent intermediaries. Obviously this results from 
the contrary effects that exclusive agents show on information services resp. additional services 
as shown in models 1 and 2, for example.    
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From  principal  agent  theory  we  derived  that  customers’  knowledge  reduces  information 
asymmetries and thus leads to an increase in the service quality provided. However, according to 
our  estimations  service  quality  does  not  depend  on  the  degree  of  information  asymmetries 
between consumers and intermediaries as measured by consumers’ knowledge about insurance 
related matters (models 1 to 4). 
All in all our data give mixed evidence on the product quality hypothesis, depending on the 
proxies  we  use  to  account  for  service  quality.  Our  estimations  support  that  independent 
intermediaries provide better quality in regard to information services, which also shows in better 
market  performance.  In  contrast,  we  find  no  differences  between  exclusive  and  independent 
intermediaries in regard to total service quality, while the product quality hypothesis even has to 
be rejected with respect to additional services.  
Hypothesis 2 – Specialization and Economies of Scale and Scope 
Models 1 to 4 also test for the impact of specialization and economies of scale and scope on the 
service quality provided by insurance intermediaries. The coefficient estimates for firm size show 
no significant impact on the quality of the information services, the total service quality or the 
contract conclusion rate. Only for additional services we find a significantly negative effect for 
small firm size. Obviously, it does pay less for smaller intermediary firms to offer additional 
services than for larger ones. Besides, also specialization on a certain insurance company and its 
products shows no statistically significant coefficient estimates. In contrast to that, specialization 
on  old  age  insurance  has  a  significantly  positive  impact  on  both  the  provision  of  additional 
services as well as on total service quality (models 2 and 3). There are a number of different 
products to account for old age provisions, like life insurance or annuities, but also investment 
funds. This provides ample scope for intermediaries to offer additional services like financial 
counseling,  investment  found  business  etc.  to  consumers,  which  in  turn  also  increases  total 
service quality. We also find a positive impact for specialization on customer segments on the 
information quality and the total service quality provided, which is also statistically significant in 
models 1 and 3. As theory suggests, intermediaries that specialize on particular customers can 
reuse information for this segment more often. Accordingly it pays for them to invest more in 
acquiring and processing information which is specific to this particular customer segment, which 
in turn results in higher information and service quality. However, according to model 4 this does 
not reflect in a higher contract conclusion rate.   
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Finally, when using the variable additional services as independent, we find significantly positive 
coefficient  estimates  for  the  information  index  and  the  contract  conclusion  rate.  Obviously, 
providing more additional services increases the quality of the information services provided and 
also results in a higher contract conclusion rate, thus reflecting consumers’ satisfaction with an 
intermediary’s services. Thus, our findings seem to support the thesis that economies of scope 
can be realized.  
When controlling for consumers’ demand on information provision and on additional services for 
free,  our  estimations  show  a  mostly  significantly  positive  impact  on  the  information  index, 
additional services and the service index in all our models. However, there is no statistically 
significant effect on the economic performance as measured by the contract conclusion rate. 
When controlling for efforts spent and informational inputs in models 6 and 10, we find that high 
demand for information services by consumers significantly reduces the number of additional 
services provided. All in all, intermediaries seem to take the demand of their customers into 
account  in  the  extent  and  type  of  services  provided.  Note  that  competitive  pressure  has  a 
significantly negative impact on the contract conclusion rate. In particular, it does not affect the 
information service quality in a significant way. 
Hypothesis 3 – Efforts Spent 
In models 5 to 8 we analyze the impact of investment in human capital and insurance related 
knowledge and skills as well as of the time spent for different activities as proxies to explain 
differences in service quality between intermediaries. Since independent intermediaries distribute 
information of products from more insurance companies than exclusive agents, we include the 
intermediary type to control for the resulting differences in search efforts.  
According to our estimation results neither formal educational levels, additional training
22 nor 
work experience have any explanatory power in regard to the different quality indicators used. 
Thus, it makes no sense for consumers to use these as signals for the information and service 
quality of an intermediary. Age shows a significantly negative impact on the number of additional 
services provided (model 6). This might account for the fact that providing additional services 
requires additional investment in the knowledge and skills. Following human capital theory one 
                                                 
22   Only in regard to the contract conclusion rate we find that intermediaries with additional training do perform 
poorer, see equ.8.  
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can argue that the readiness to incur such investment decreases with age, since the older an 
intermediary is, the more dubious it becomes whether she will be able to realize the gains from 
such an investment in her remaining working life. Besides, model 8 shows that the contract 
conclusion rate is also negatively affected by an intermediary’s age. This might result from the 
fact that new business becomes less important the older an intermediary is, since she derives her 
main income from long-term customers.  While further trainings have a significantly positive 
effect on the services provided (models 5 to 7), this does not pay in terms of contracts concluded. 
Quite to the contrary we find a significantly negative impact on the contract conclusion rate 
(model 8). However, one should be cautious in interpreting this in a causal way, since it also 
seems  plausible  that  the  lower  the  contract  conclusion  rate,  the  more  further  trainings  an 
intermediary attends – hoping to learn about how to become more successful.  
When using the information index as the dependent variable, in models 5 and 9 the coefficient 
estimates for the percentage of time spent on counseling interviews, further training and claims 
settlement are significantly positive. These results are consistent with hypothesis 3 that more 
efforts spent on activities which are related to the production of information services increase 
their quality. Obviously, insurance intermediaries gain specific knowledge about what topics and 
what information is relevant for consumers mainly through investment in further trainings and by 
claims  settlement.  These  two  activities  exhibit  large  fixed  costs.  Besides,  information  about 
claims settlement is highly specific. It entails consumer-specific information about the likelihood 
of  damage  and  insurance  company-specific  information  about  the  consequences  of  specific 
contract terms for claims settlement as well as insurance companies’ handling in case of loss. 
Thus, these results also support the hypothesis that intermediated search has advantages which 
cannot be attained through personal search by consumers. For a single consumer neither the high 
costs of attending insurance intermediaries’ further trainings would pay off nor does she have the 
opportunity  to  acquire  the  activity-specific  knowledge  resulting  from  claims  settlement.  But 
although claims settlement activities improve the service quality provided, they do not pay off for 
intermediaries in terms of economic success. Time spent on claims settlement has a negative, and 
in model 12 also significant impact on the contract conclusion rate. Besides, the  coefficient 
estimate for the percentage of time spent on sales efforts shows a significantly negative impact on 
the contract conclusion rate both in models 8 and 12. This implies that more sales efforts are 
primarily incurred when contract conclusion rates are low, that is when economic success is poor.  
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The  coefficient  estimate  for  the  absolute  time  spent  on  counseling  interviews 
(duration_interviews) shows a significantly positive impact across all service quality indicators in 
models 5 to 12 with the exception of the additional services offered (models 6 and 10). Time 
spent for counseling thus enhances both the information quality provided as well as the total 
service quality supplied and finally also results in a higher percentage of contracts concluded by 
an insurance intermediary.  
Summarizing, our evidence does not confirm hypothesis 3, this holds while even controlling for 
insurance intermediary type. Our data show that it does neither makes sense for consumers to use 
formal educational levels or training certificates as a signal for high service quality, nor does it 
pay for intermediaries to invest more in human capital, at least not when the contract conclusion 
rate is used as a proxy for economic success. However, specific activities like claims settlement 
and  further  training  show  a  positive  impact.  Not  surprisingly,  time  spent  for  counseling 
interviews proves to be statistically significant for information and services quality. It also pays 
for  intermediaries,  since  it  increases  their  market  performance  as  measured  in  the  contract 
conclusion rate. 
Hypothesis 4 – Informational Input 
Finally,  hypothesis  4  analyzes  what  impact  informational  input  has  on  the  quality  of  the 
intermediation services provided. While models 5, 7, 9 and 11 estimate the effect of different 
information sources and consumers’ cooperation, models 6, 8, 10 and 12 also account for the 
informational content provided in counseling interviews.
23  
The estimation results for models 5 and 9 indicate that intermediaries, who rely strongly on 
rating  agencies,  the  science  and  specialist  publications  as  sources  of  credible  information, 
provide  significantly higher information  quality  as  well  as total service  quality.  In  regard  to 
information  quality  also  a  high  reliance  on  consumers’  associations  as  a  credible  source  of 
information shows a significantly positive impact. In comparison, estimation results suggest that 
the more important further trainings are as a source of gathering information for intermediaries, 
the lower the information and total service quality provided is. This indicates that information, 
knowledge and skills as circulated in further trainings is not conducive to increasing information 
                                                 
23   Since these variables enter the information index and the total service index, we omit them in the models using 
these variables as dependent.   
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quality (models 5 and 9), which also shows in  its negative effect on total service quality in 
models 7 and 11. This also leads to poor economic performance as measured by the contract 
conclusion rate (model 8).  
Furthermore, our data reveals a significantly positive impact of the information content provided 
on  the  number  of  additional  services  provided,  if  an  intermediary  puts  higher  weight  on 
informing customers on general aspects and on their personal risk profile and security options. 
The coefficient estimates in models 8 and 12 show a significantly positive effect on the contract 
conclusion  rate,  the  more  weight  an  intermediary  puts  on  informing  his  customers  on  their 
personal risk profile and security options and on the calculation of participation rates of life 
insurance products. In contrast to that, providing information about policy design, contract design 
and  contract  execution shows  no  significant  impact  across  all  models.  Despite  their  alleged 
importance for the quality of the insurance purchase transaction, consumers seem not to honor it 
(as there is no significant impact on the contract conclusion rate).  
The service quality provided by an insurance intermediary is in part the outcome of an interactive 
process between the intermediary and the customer, since it also depends on the revelation of 
privately held information by the consumer. Accordingly, we hypothesized that the better the 
cooperation between intermediary and consumer works, the higher the service quality should be. 
To account for this, we employ consumers’ knowledge about different insurance relevant matters 
as well as their demand for information provision and additional services as proxies. The higher 
their knowledge resp. demand is, the better the overall outcome should be. For the information 
index (model 5) and for the service index (model 7) our estimations show significantly positive 
coefficient estimates for consumers’ knowledge about their risk profile. These findings suggest 
that intermediaries provide only additional information and thus higher information quality, if 
their customers already have a high level of knowledge about their risk profile, but a low level of 
knowledge about protection for old-age security. There are two possible answers to this finding. 
On the one hand, this is the expected result, since half of the items summarized in the dependent 
variable information index concern old-age protection. It is unnecessary for an intermediary to 
put much weight on such topics, if his customers already have a high level of knowledge about 
them.  On  the  other  hand,  insurance  intermediaries  rely  strongly  on  income  from  selling  life 
insurance policies and other products concerning old-age security. Accordingly, they should have 
an interest in increasing consumers’ knowledge about exactly such insurance products. This is in  
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line with the finding that insurance intermediaries do not provide significantly more information 
to customers with low knowledge on the disadvantages of insurance products compared to other 
financial assets which can be used  as substitutes. In  regard to additional services and to the 
contract  conclusion  rate  consumers’  knowledge  seems  to  play  no  role,  since  we  find  no 
statistically  relevant  influence.  To  summarize,  consumers  cannot  expect  intermediaries  to 
automatically provide additional information in case they have only limited  knowledge. This 
supports  the  statement  of  principal  agent  theory  according  to  which  under  information 
asymmetries only low service quality should result.  
Although  the  cooperation  between  insurance  intermediaries  and  their  customers  affects  the 
quality of the advice given, consumers might nevertheless differ in their willingness to participate 
in the counseling process. To account for such differences among consumers, we use consumers’ 
demand for information provision and consumers’ demand for additional services for free as 
proxies. Models 5 and 6 confirm our findings already stated in regard to hypothesis 2. Obviously, 
consumer’s can induce insurance intermediaries to provide better information and service quality 
by communicating a higher demand for it. However, it does not increase the contract conclusion 
rate.  
All in all, our evidence shows some support for the findings of transaction costs, search and 
principal agent theory as stated in hypothesis 4 according to which the service quality provided 
positively  depends  on  the  underlying  informational  input  and  on  cooperation  between  the 
intermediary and her customer. However, there seems to be a conflict for intermediaries between 
economic  success  as  measured  by  the  contract  conclusion  rate  and  providing  detailed 
information about relevant contractual aspects of insurance coverage. Together with the profound 
information asymmetries between intermediaries and consumers it, thus, follows that that for 
rational intermediaries high quality information services will not come first.  
Discussion 
To see the effect of combining our hypotheses, we estimate models 9 to 12 (Table 2 below). They 
show that our findings from models 1 to 8 are quite robust (see discussion above). In addition the 
explanatory power of our estimations clearly improves, when including variables that account for 
the  efforts  spent  and  the informational  inputs  used  in  providing  intermediation services.  The 
adjusted Rsquares of all four service variable proxies increase from models 1 to 4 to models 9 to 
12 by between 6% and 12%. This clearly indicates that service quality depends not only on  
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whether  intermediaries  are  more  or  less (in-)dependent from  insurance  companies. There  are 
additional  differences  in  the  service  quality  provided  by  intermediaries  which  cannot  be 
explained by them being either exclusive agents or insurance brokers, but by the information 
gathering and processing activities they perform.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
For analyzing how sensitive our findings are with respect to the functional forms applied, we 
carried  out  a  number  of  logit  and  double-log  estimations.
24  Their  results  confirm  the  main 
findings from  above.  Besides,  we  performed  a  number  of  stability  tests. They  also  show no 
indication  that  omitted  variables  or  incorrect  functional  form  create  bias  in  the  coefficient 
estimates. In addition, we performed post-hoc statistical power tests which provide no evidence 
that our regressions suffer from low statistical power.
25  
5. Conclusions 
Quite  in  accordance  with  the  empirical  literature  our  estimations  also  provide  no  uniform 
evidence on the product quality hypothesis. According to our findings, independent agents and 
insurance brokers provide better service quality when information services and their contract 
conclusion rates are used as proxies, while exclusive agents provide significantly more additional 
services. When taken together, then, there are no significant differences to be found between 
these various distribution channels in regard to the total service quality provided.  
Also in regard l to hypothesis 2 on specialization and economies of scale, our findings are not 
uniform. Increasing firm size enables insurance intermediaries to realize economies of scale only 
in regard to the provision of additional services. Our data do not give evidence that firm size 
matters in regard to information quality, total service quality or the contract conclusion rate. 
Accordingly,  acquiring  and  processing  information  about  topics  relevant  for  concluding  an 
insurance contract seem to exhibit divisibility among members of the same agency. This is in line 
                                                 
24   Since these estimations provide no additional explanatory power, we omitted them in the reported estimations 
below. Regression results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
25   According to Cohen (1988) a test has sufficient power given a power value of at least 0.8. The power values are 
reported in Tables 1 and 2.  
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with findings of Cummins (1977) that there are no scale economies for independent insurance 
agents. Besides, according to our findings there are also no economies of scale to be realized by 
specializing on an insurance company and its products or on a certain insurance line. However, 
there  is  some  evidence  that  economies of  scale can  be  realized  by specializing on  customer 
segments.
 Besides, in accordance with ypothesis 2 we found clear evidence that economies of 
scope can be realized by offering additional services.  
As concerns the efforts spent by insurance intermediaries, we find that the duration of counseling 
interviews is the single most important factor that has a positive effect both on the information 
quality  and  on  the  total  service  quality  provided,  while  it  simultaneously  also  pays  for 
intermediaries  as  it  increases  their  contract  conclusion  rate.  In  contrast  to  that,  we  find  no 
evidence that different educational levels or additional trainings show a significant impact. Thus, 
such certificates should not be used by consumers as indicators of high service quality. Moreover, 
our data give some support for findings derived from transaction costs, search and principal agent 
theory that the service quality provided is positively affected by the informational inputs used. 
Finally,  we  find  that  despite  the  profound  information  asymmetries  between  insurance 
intermediaries and their customers, consumers’ demand for information and additional services 
indeed  results  in  better  service  quality.  Thus,  more  demanding  consumers  should  expect 
intermediaries to provide better counseling and advisory services.  
All in all, we thus find that the service quality of insurance intermediaries does not only depend 
on whether they are exclusive agents or insurance brokers. There are also quality differences that 
cannot  be  accounted  for  by  the  distribution  channel  and  its  characteristics  to  which  an 
intermediary belongs. According to our findings, the quality of the services provided depends 
also to a large extent on their information gathering and processing activities of the individual 
intermediaries. Because of the important role insurance intermediaries play in insurance markets 
in reducing information asymmetries between consumers and insurance companies, additional 
research should be undertaken to better understand how high service quality is produced. Thus, 
research  efforts  should  concentrate  not  only  on  explaining  the  coexistence  of  different 
distribution  systems, but  also on explaining  differences  in  service  quality  within a  particular 
distribution channel. Besides, further efforts are necessary to find better proxies to account for 
insurance intermediaries’ service quality. One main limitation of our data is that they do not 
allow  us  to  make  any  statements  about  the  informational  content  actually  provided  by  an  
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intermediary to his customers. To get such data, for example a combination of mystery shopping 
interviews with a follow-up survey on the information processing activities of the interviewed 












Baranoff, E., and T. Sager, 2003, The Relations Among Organizational and Distribution Forms 
and  Capital  and  Asset  Risk  Structure  in  the  Life  Insurance  Industry,  Journal  of  Risk  and 
Insurance, 70: 375-400. 
Barrese,  J.,  and  J.M.  Nelson,  1992,  Independent  and  Exclusive  Agency  Insurers:  A 
Reexamination of the Cost Differential, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 59: 375-397. 
Barrese, J., H. Doerpinghaus, and J.M. Nelson, 1995, Do Independent Agent Insurers Provide 
Superior Service? The Insurance Marketing Puzzle, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 62: 297-
308. 
Berger, A., D. Cummins, and M. Weiss, 1997, The Coexistence of Multiple Distribution Systems 
for Financial Services: The Case of Property-Liability Insurance, Journal of Business, 70: 515-
546. 
Berger, A.N., and G.F. Udell, 1990, Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm 
Finance, Journal of Business, 68: 351-381. 
Cohen, J., 1988, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence 
Earlbaum Associates), 2
nd ed. 
Cooper,  L.G.,  and  M.  Nakanishi,  1988,  Market  Share  Analysis.  Evaluating  Competitive 
Marketing Effectiveness (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers).  
  32 
Cummins, J.D., 1977, Economics of Scale in Independent Insurance Agencies, Journal of Risk 
and Insurance, 44: 539-553. 
Cummins, J.D., and N.A. Doherty, 2006, The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries, Journal of 
Risk and Insurance, 73: 359-396. 
Cummins, J.D., and J. VanDerhei, 1979, A Note on the Relative Efficiency of Property-Liability 
Insurance Distribution Systems, Bell Journal of Economics, 10: 709-719. 
Cummins,  J.D.,  and  S.  Weisbart,  1977,  The  Impact  of  Consumer  Services  on  Independent 
Insurance  Agency  Performance  (Glenmont,  New  York:  IMA  Education  and  Research 
Foundation). 
Darby, M.R., and E. Karni, 1973, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, Journal of 
Law and Economics, 16: 67-88. 
Davis,  E.  Philip.  2004,  Is  there  a  Pension  Crisis  in  the  UK?  Geneva  Papers  on  Risk  and 
Insurance: Issues and Practice, 29: 343-370. 
Diekmann,  A.,  2000,  Empirische  Sozialforschung.  Grundlagen,  Methoden,  Anwendungen 
(Reinbeck: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag). 
Doerpinghaus, H.I., 1991, An Analysis of Complaint Data in the Automobile Insurance Industry, 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 58: 120-127. 
Eckardt,  M.,  2002,  Agent  and  Broker  Intermediaries  in  Insurance  Markets  –  An  Empirical 
Analysis of Market Outcomes, Thünen-Series of Applied Economic Theory, Working Paper 34 
(Rostock: Rostock University). 
Eckardt, M., 2007, Insurance Intermediation: An Economic Analysis of the Information Services 
Market (Berlin, Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag).   
Etgar, M., 1976, Service Performance of Insurance Distribution, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 
43: 487-499. 
nstleistungen. (Nomos, Baden-Baden), 63–183. 
Federal Statistical Office, 2004, Statistical Yearbook 2004 for the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Wiesbaden). 
GDV,  2002,  GDV  EVW-Datenbank.  Erhebung-Vertriebs-Wege,  1999/2000,  insgesamt, 
Gesamtbestand, mimeo. 
Gravelle, H., 1993, Product Price and Advice Quality: Implications of the Commission System in 
Life Assurance, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 18: 31-53. 
Greene, W. H., 2000, Econometric Analysis (London: Prentice Hall International). 
Grossman, S., and O. Hart, 1986,  The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical 
and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, 94: 691-719. 
Hirshleifer, J., 1973, Where are we in Theory of Information?, American Economic Review, 63: 
31-39. 
Horsch, A., 2004, Agency und Versicherungsintermediation, Wirtschaftsstudium, 531–536. 
Jaccard,  J.,  and  C.K.  Wan,  1996,  LISREL  Approaches  to  Interaction  Effects  in  Multiple 
Regression (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications).  
  33 
Joskow,  P.,  1973,  Cartels,  Competition  and  Regulation  in  the  Property-Liability  Insurance 
Industry, Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 4: 375-427. 
Kim, W., D. Mayers, and C.W. Smith, 1996, On the Choice of Insurance Distribution Systems, 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 63: 207-227. 
Kurland, N.B., 1995, Ethics, Incentives, and Conflicts of Interest: A Practical Solution, Journal 
of Business Ethics, 14: 465–475. 
Kurland, N.B., 1996, Sales Agents and Clients: Ethics, Incentives, and a Modified Theory of 
Planned Behavior, Human Relations, 49: 51–74. 
Laslett,  R.,  T.  Wilsdon,  and  K.  Malcolm,  2002,  Polarisation:  Research  into  the  Effect  of 
Commission  Based  Remuneration  on  Advice  (London:  Charles  River  Associates  Ltd.), 
http//:www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/pol_res1.pdf. 
Marvel, H., 1982, Exclusive Dealing,  Journal of Law and Economics, 25: 1-25. 
Mauntel,  U.,  2004,  Bedarfs-  und  produktbezogene  Beratung  beim  Abschluss  von 
Lebensversicherungsverträgen (Karlsruhe: Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft). 
Mayers,  D.,  and  C.W.  Smith,  1981,  Contractual  Provisions,  Organizational  Structure,  and 
Conflict Control in Insurance Markets, Journal of Business, 54: 407-434. 
Nelson, P., 1970, Information and Consumer Behavior, Journal of Political Economy, 78: 311-
329. 
Neuberger,  D.,  and  S.  Raethke-Doeppner,  2008,  Microenterprises  and  Multiple  Bank 
Relationships: The Case of Professionals, Small Business Economics, forthcoming. 
Posey, L.L., and A. Yavas, 1995, A Search Model of Marketing Systems in Property-Liability 
Insurance, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 62: 666-689. 
Posey,  L.L.,  and  S.  Tennyson,  1998,  The  Coexistence  of  Distribution  Systems  Under  Price 
Search:  Theory  and  Some  Evidence  from  Insurance,  Journal  of  Economic  Behavior  and 
Organization, 35: 95-115. 
Regan, L., 1997, Vertical Integration in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry: A Transaction 
Cost Approach, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64: 41-62. 
Regan,  L.,  and  L.Y.  Tzeng,  1999,  Organizational  Form  in  the  Property-Liability  Insurance 
Industry: A Transaction Cost Approach, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 66: 253-273. 
Regan, L., and S. Tennyson, 1996, Agent Discretion and the Choice of Insurance Distribution 
System, Journal of Law and Economics, 39: 637-666. 
Regan,  L.,  and  S.  Tennyson,  2000,  Insurance  Distribution  Systems,  in:  Dionne,  G.,  ed., 
Handbook of Insurance (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers), 709-748. 
Rehberg, M., 2003,  Der Versicherungsabschluss als Informationsproblem. Die Gewährleistung 
freier Produktwahl in der Privatversicherung (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft). 
Rose, F., 1999, The Economics, Concept, and Design of Information Intermediaries, (Heidelberg: 
Physica Verlag). 
Sass, T., and M. Gisser, 1989, Agency Costs, Firm Size and Exclusive Dealing, Journal of Law 
and Economics, 32: 381-400.  
  34 
Seog, S.H., 1999, The Coexistence of Distribution Systems When Consumers Are Not Informed, 
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 24: 173-192. 
Seog, S.H., 2005, Distribution Systems and Operating Leverage, Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and 
Insurance, 1: 45-61. 
Spulber,  D.F.,  1999,  Market  Microstructure.  Intermediaries  and  the  Theory  of  the  Firm 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Stock, J.H., and M.W. Watson, 2003, Introduction to Econometrics (Boston: Addison Wesley). 
Towers Perrin, 2007, Tillinghast Vertriebswege-Survey, Köln 
Trigo Gamarra, L., 2007a Single- versus Multi-Channel Distribution Strategies in the German 
Life Insurance Industry - A Cost and Profit Efficiency Analysis, Thünen Series of Applied 
Economic Theory, Working Paper 81, (Rostock: Rostock University). 
Trigo Gamarra, L., 2007b, Does the Product Quality Hypothesis Hold True? - Service Quality 
Differences between Independent and Exclusive Insurance Agents, Thünen Series of Applied 
Economic Theory, Working Paper 76, (Rostock: Rostock University). 
Ward, D., 2003, Can Independent Distribution Function as a Mode of Corporate Governance? An 
Examination of the UK Life Insurance Market, Journal of Management and Governance, 7: 
361-384. 
Zweifel,  P.,  and  P.  Ghermi,  1990,  Exclusive  vs.  Independent  Agencies:  A  Comparison  of 
Performance, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, 15: 171-192. 
Zinnert, M and H. Griess, 1997, Der Versicherungsmakler. Position und Funktion aus rechtlicher 
und wirtschaftlicher Sicht, (Karlsruhe: Verlag Verischerungswirtschaft)  
  
  35 
Table 1:  Regression Results 
a Dependent variable: log (contract conclusion rate/(1-contract conclusion rate)) 
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(3.28)     
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Table 1:  Regression Results (cont.) 
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Table 1:  Regression Results (cont.) 
























































Information source                 
Insurance companies 





































































Source_further training  









Information content                 
General Aspects 
         
0.378*** 
(3.68)   
0.025 
(0.48) 
Calculation of participation rates 
         
0.107 




         
-0.075 
(-0.72)   
-0.042 
(-0.84) 
Personal risk profile and security options  
         
0.336*** 
(3.02)   
0.155*** 
(2.94)  
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Table 1:  Regression Results (cont.) 

















         
-0.030 
(-0.28)   
0.002 
(0.04) 
Private old-age insurance products 
         
-0.076 




         
-0.033 
(-0.35)   
0.023 
(0.47) 
Rsquare  0.149  0.097  0.064  0.172  0.229  0.172  0.183  0.197 
Adj. Rsquare  0.133  0.082  0.048  0.155  0.194  0.121  0.146  0.142 
F-Test  10.46***  0.096**  3.49***  9.48***  7.30***  3.29***  4.79***  4.30*** 
Power test (α=0.001)  1.000  1.000  0.847  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
*** significant at the 1%- level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
t-values in parentheses 
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Table 2:  Regression Results 
a Dependent variable: log (contract conclusion rate/(1-contract conclusion rate)) 
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Table 2:  Regression Results (cont.) 
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(2.85)   
0.025 
(0.46) 
Calculation of participation rates 
 
0.098 






(0.23)   
-0.052 
(-0.99) 
Personal risk profile and security options  
 
0.346*** 






(-0.42)   
-0.012 
(-0.21) 
Private old-age insurance products 
 
-0.025 
(-0.24)   
0.086* 
(1.61)  
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Table 2:  Regression Results (cont.) 











(0.15)   
0.052 
(1.03) 
Rsquare  0.252  0.228  0.195  0.282 
Adj. Rsquare  0.202  0.163  0.143  0.214 
F-Test  5.86***  3.86***  3.84***  4.84*** 
Power test (α=0.001)  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Hypotheses  
 
 
Hypotheses  Independent Variable  Expected Sign of  
Coefficient Estimates 
H 1: Product Quality Hypothesis 
Independent intermediaries provide better service 
quality. 
exclusive agent 





H 2: Specialization, Economies of Scale and Scope 
Specialization and economies of scale and scope lead 
to better service quality. 
firm size 









H 3: Efforts spend  
The more an intermediary invests in general and 
insurance-specific human capital (knowledge and 
skills) and the more time an intermediary spends on 
information processing and counseling interviews, the 




























H 4: Informational Input  
The better the information sources used by an 
intermediary are, the more information about relevant 
subjects an intermediary provides in counseling 
interviews and the more consumers’ cooperate, the 
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Table A.2:  Definition and Measurement of Variables 





  Information index  Continuous variable measuring the mean value of 27 items
26 about the 
importance attached to different aspects in counseling interviews by the 
intermediary ranging from  
1 = very  low quality ... 5 = very high quality 
  Additional services  Continuous variable measuring the number of additional services provided 
  Service index  Continuous variable measuring the total services quality. It is the additive 
aggregation of the normalized variables information index and additional 
services, with the information index entering with double weight. 
  Contract conclusion 
rate 
Continuous variable measuring the proportion of the average number of 








Intermediary type  Set of dummy variables with 1 = intermediary type, 0 = other:  
exclusive agent; independent intermediary 
reference class: independent intermediary 
Specialization 
Variables 
Firm size  Dummy variable measuring the size of an intermediary’s firm with 1 = yes, 
0 = no 
Small (1-3 employees), medium (4-9 employees), large (10-30 employees) 
reference class: medium (4-9 employees) 
  Insurance company   Dummy variable on specialization on a certain insurance company and its 
products with  
1 = yes, 0 = no 
  Insurance company 
reputation 
Continuous variable measuring the factor score extracted by a factor 
analyses which indicate how much weight intermediaries attach to the 
quality of the insurance company and the quality of the products they 
distribute for gaining reputation  
  Insurance line  Dummy variable on specialization in old-age insurance products with  
1 = yes, 0 = no 
  Customer segment  Dummy variable on specialization on customer segments with  
1 = yes, 0 = no 
                                                 
26   For the single items see Table A.4 below.  
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Table A.2:  Definition and Measurement of Variables (cont.) 




Age  Continuous variable measuring the age of the interviewed intermediary in 
years 
  Formal education  Set of dummy variables with 1 = highest degree of formal education, 0 = 
other: 
lower secondary school; intermediate leaving certificate; certificate of 
aptitude for  specialized short-course higher education; general certificate 
of aptitude for higher education  
reference class: general certificate of aptitude for higher education  
  (Additional) Training  Dummy variable with 1 = (additional) training, 0 = none 
  University degree  Dummy variable with 1 = university degree, 0 = none 
  Work experience  Continuous variable measuring work experience in years 
  Further 
training_number 
Continuous variable measuring the number of further training courses, 




Time budget  5 continuous variables measuring the share of the time spent for a certain 
activity on the total time budget:  
information acquisition and processing; counseling interviews; further 
training; claims settlement; sales efforts 
  Duration_interviews  Continuous variable measuring the average duration of general counseling 
interviews in minutes 
  Information source  7 continuous variables measuring the importance of an information source 
used by an intermediary with its attached objectivity on a  
25-point rating scale with 1 = very subjective  and not at all important 
source … 25 = very credible and very important source: 
insurance companies; professional associations; rating agencies; 
consumers’ associations; science; specialist publications; general media  
  Source_further 
training 
Ordinal variable measuring the importance attached to further training as 
an information source measured on a five-point Likert scale with 1 = not 
at all important … 5 = very important  
  Information content  7 continuous variables measuring the factor scores extracted by a factor 
analysis from 27 items which indicate the importance attached to different 
aspects in counseling interviews by the intermediary:
27 
old-age security in general; calculation of participation rates; contract 
design; personal risk profile and needs; policy design; private old-age 
insurance products; contract execution 
  Additional services  Continuous variable measuring the number of additional services provided 
 
                                                 
27   For more details see Tables A.4 and  A.5 below.  
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Table A.2:  Definition and Measurement of Variables (cont.) 
  Variable  Explanation and Measurement 
Customer 
Variables 
Customers’ knowledge  3 ordinal variables indicating customers’ knowledge on a five-point Likert 
scale with 1 = very bad knowledge … 5 =  very good knowledge: 
risk profile; old-age protection provisions; (dis-)advantages of insurance 
products 
  Customers’ demand  2 ordinal variables measuring consumers’ demand on a five-point Likert 
scale with 1 = more modest … 5 = more demanding about: 
information services; additional services for free 
Market 
Variable 
Competitive pressure  Ordinary variable measuring the extent of competitive pressure on a five-
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Table A.3:  Descriptive Statistics  
Dependent Variables  Min  Max  Mean  Median  StandDev  N 
Information Index  1.407  5.000  3.716  3.703  0.531  917 
Information Index Dummy  0.000  1.000  0.523  1.000  0.499  938 
Contract Conclusion Rate  -2.944  4.595  0.743  0.847  1.195  830 
Additional Services  0.000  15.000  6.650  7.000  2.333  927 
Service Index 
 
6.000  15.000  11.330  11.000  1.484  912 
Independent Variables             
Intermediary type             
Exclusive agent  0.000  1.000  0.452  0.000  0.497  933 
Firm size             
Small (1 to 3 employees)  0.000  1.000  0.642  1.000  0.479  910 
Medium (3 to 9 employees)  0.000  1.000  0.280  0.000  0.449  910 
Large (more then 9 employees)  0.000  1.000  0.076  0.000  0.266  910 
Specialization             
Insurance company  0.000  1.000  0.605  1.000  0.489  915 
Insurance company reputation  -3.838  2.783  0.000  0.076  1.000  864 
Insurance line  0.000  1.000  0.384  0.000  0.486  938 
Customer Segment  0.000  1.000  0.567  1.000  0.496  938 
Age  20.000  64.000  43.102  42.000  8.966  929 
Formal education             
Lower secondary school  0.000  1.000  0.118  0.000  0.323  935 
Intermediate leaving certificate  0.000  1.000  0.376  0.000  0.484  935 
Certificate of aptitude for 
specialized short-course in higher 
education 
0.000  1.000  0.186  0.000  0.389  935 
(Additional) Training  0.000  1.000  0.915  1.000  0.278  933 
University degree  0.000  1.000  0.266  0.000  0.442  905 
Work experience  1.000  48.000  16.059  14.000  8.324  928 
Further training_number             
Time budget             
Information acquisition and 
processing 
0.000  0.700  0.212  0.200  0.124  866 
Counseling interviews  0.000  0.900  0.368  0.350  0.157  867 
Further training  0.000  0.500  0.115  0.100  0.066  867 
Claims settlement  0.000  0.500  0.111  0.100  0.076  866 
Sales efforts  0.000  0.700  0.061  0.050  0.057  867 
Duration_interviews  10.000  180.000  56.710  60.000  31.314  884 
Information source             
Insurance companies  1.000  25.000  11.064  10.000  5.745  906 
Professional associations  1.000  25.000  12.090  12.000  5.735  866 
Rating agencies  1.000  25.000  11.295  12.000  6.257  861 
Consumers’ associations  1.000  25.000  8.109  8.000  5.412  861 
Science  1.000  25.000  9.244  9.000  5.534  821 
Specialist publications  1.000  25.000  13.830  13.500  5.489  896 
General media  1.000  25.000  6.668  6.000  4.485  873 
Source_further training   1.000  5.000  2.340  2.000  1.095  898 
Information content             
General aspects  -4.126  2.489  0.000  0.105  1.000  828 
Calculation of participation rates  -3.543  2.853  0.000  0.092  1.000  828 
Contract design  -2.811  4.293  0.000  0.043  1.000  828  
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Table A.3:  Descriptive Statistics (cont.) 
Independent Variables  Min  Max  Mean  Median  StandDev  N 
Personal risk profile and security 
options   -5.875  2.804  0.000  0.089  1.000  828 
Policy design  -3.706  2.305  0.000  0.036  1.000  828 
Private old-age insurance 
products  -3.274  2.120  0.000  0.122  1.000  828 
Contract execution  -3.272  3.013  0.000  0.094  1.000  828 
Customers’ demand             
Information provision  1.000  5.000  4.008  4.000  0.751  918 
Additional services for free  1.000  5.000  3.753  4.000  0.928  916 
Customers’ knowledge             
Risk profile  1.000  5.000  2.647  3.000  0.763  921 
Old-age protection provisions  1.000  5.000  2.749  3.000  0.747  919 
(Dis-) Advantages of insurance 
products 
1.000  5.000  2.326  2.000  0.862  920 
Competitive pressure  1.000  5.000  3.326  3.000  1.005  893 
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Table A.4: Factor Analysis Information Content – Rotated Component Matrix 
  Components           
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 




















Tax advantages  .809             
Occupational pension 





           









           





           
Surplus and interest 
rate changes 
   
.782 
         
Non commitment    .709           
Guaranteed 
performance 
   
.702 
         
Surplus determinants    .619           
Past effective surplus    .615           
Termination options      .845         
Contract period      .789         
Procedures of 
contract modification 
     
.658 
       
Costs of contract 
modification 
     
.585 
       
Type and coverage of 
the insured risks 
       
.725 
     
Individual security 
gaps 
       
.695 
     
Insurance and product 
types 
       
.609 
     
(Dis-) advantages of 
different security 
options 
       
 
.533 
     
Premium design          .778     
Price-performance 
tests 
         
.762 
   
Cost components          .593     
Capital sum life 
insurance vs. Riester 
policy 




Cost calculation by 
change of policy 
           
.774 
 
Specific rest life 
insurance vs. capital 
sum life insurance 




Claim settlement              .710 
Conflict settlement              .602 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser-normalization.  
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Table A.5:  Factor Analysis Information Content – Sampling Adequacy and Total Variance  
                    Explained 
Measure of sampling adequacy by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistics     0.889 





Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 
Component  Total  % of 
Variance 
Cumula-
tive %  Total  % of 
Variance 
Cumula-




1  7.658 28.361 28.361 7.658 28.361 28.361 2.876 10.654 10.654
2  1.884 6.976 35.337 1.884 6.976 35.337 2.758 10.215 20.868
3  1.754 6.496 41.834 1.754 6.496 41.834 2.652 9.823 30.691
4  1.513 5.605 47.439 1.513 5.605 47.439 2.374 8.792 39.483
5  1.415 5.242 52.681 1.415 5.242 52.681 2.209 8.181 47.664
6  1.252 4.638 57.319 1.252 4.638 57.319 2.004 7.421 55.085
7  1.076 3.985 61.304 1.076 3.985 61.304 1.679 6.219 61.304
8  .795 2.944 64.248
9  .781 2.891 67.139
10  .754 2.791 69.930
11  .729 2.702 72.632
12  .697 2.580 75.212
13  .648 2.399 77.611
14  .620 2.297 79.909
15  .573 2.121 82.029
16  .549 2.034 84.064
17  .505 1.870 85.934
18  .491 1.817 87.751
19  .459 1.700 89.451
20  .430 1.593 91.044
21  .420 1.558 92.601
22  .397 1.470 94.072
23  .373 1.370 95.451
24  .350 1.298 96.749
25  .319 1.180 97.930
26  .301 1.116 99.046
27  .258 .954 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
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Table A.6:  Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42
1 Age 1,00
2 Formal education-lower secondary school 0,18 1,00
3 Formal education-intermediate leaving certificate 0,05 -0,24 1,00
4 Formal education-certificate of aptitude for specialized short-course higher education 0,04 -0,17 -0,37 1,00
5 (Additional) Training -0,07 -0,03 0,18 0,03 1,00
6 University degree -0,01 -0,20 -0,31 0,03 -0,27 1,00
7 Work experience 0,68 0,24 0,13 -0,02 0,01 -0,19 1,00
8 Time budget:information acquisition and processing -0,03 0,07 -0,03 -0,01 -0,06 0,01 -0,06 1,00
9 Time budget:counseling interviews 0,05 0,04 0,06 -0,01 0,04 -0,01 0,01 -0,27 1,00
10 Time budget:further training 0,03 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,11 -0,03 0,05 0,08 -0,11 1,00
11 Time budget:claims settlement 0,00 0,08 -0,04 0,07 0,03 -0,06 0,06 -0,15 -0,06 0,01 1,00
12 Time budget:sales efforts -0,09 -0,09 0,12 -0,08 0,07 -0,03 -0,06 -0,06 -0,10 -0,07 0,01 1,00
13 Duration_interviews -0,06 -0,02 -0,12 0,07 -0,09 0,10 -0,08 -0,04 -0,11 0,08 -0,08 -0,08 1,00
14 Exclusive agent 0,02 0,05 0,07 -0,04 0,03 -0,06 0,02 -0,24 0,13 -0,14 0,03 -0,02 -0,16 1,00
15 Information source: insurance companies 0,12 0,08 0,00 -0,05 -0,01 0,02 0,11 -0,08 0,05 -0,05 0,03 -0,02 -0,15 0,19 1,00
16 Information source: professional associations 0,06 0,08 0,05 -0,07 -0,01 -0,05 0,11 0,01 -0,06 0,06 0,04 -0,11 -0,09 0,00 0,11 1,00
17 Information source: rating agencies -0,21 -0,09 -0,09 0,06 0,06 -0,04 -0,13 0,08 -0,04 0,12 -0,05 0,03 0,06 -0,23 -0,11 0,18 1,00
18 Information source: consumers’ associations 0,04 -0,10 -0,06 0,04 -0,08 0,05 -0,06 -0,02 0,11 0,08 -0,01 0,02 0,08 -0,08 -0,15 0,11 0,29 1,00
19 Information source: science 0,03 -0,08 0,02 0,06 -0,11 0,11 -0,01 0,09 0,00 0,15 0,00 -0,10 0,17 -0,15 -0,14 0,03 0,14 0,32 1,00
20 Information source: specialist publications 0,02 -0,01 0,06 -0,07 0,00 0,00 0,07 0,06 -0,03 0,08 0,01 0,12 0,03 -0,08 -0,10 0,13 0,06 0,20 0,30 1,00
21 Information source: general media  -0,03 -0,05 0,02 -0,04 0,02 0,00 -0,06 -0,09 0,08 0,07 0,04 0,09 0,00 -0,07 -0,08 -0,13 -0,06 0,30 0,17 0,28 1,00
22 Source_further training -0,03 -0,07 -0,13 0,02 -0,05 0,12 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 -0,09 0,00 0,09 -0,03 -0,10 -0,12 -0,15 0,09 0,09 -0,05 -0,12 0,07 1,00
23 Customers’ knowledge: risk profile -0,13 0,02 -0,16 -0,01 -0,05 0,07 -0,15 0,08 -0,10 0,06 0,05 0,02 0,05 -0,09 0,13 -0,09 0,07 -0,01 0,04 -0,05 0,10 0,04 1,00
24 Customers’ knowledge: old-age protection provisions+B44 0,03 -0,02 -0,03 0,01 0,03 0,02 0,04 -0,03 0,04 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,06 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,06 0,12 0,06 0,04 0,12 0,05 0,41 1,00
25 Customers’ knowledge:(dis-)advantages of insurance products -0,08 -0,04 -0,11 0,02 0,01 0,06 -0,10 -0,02 -0,02 0,07 0,02 0,01 0,07 0,00 0,09 -0,06 0,06 0,08 0,14 0,01 0,15 0,02 0,44 0,53 1,00
26 Firm size: small  0,11 0,06 -0,05 0,00 0,02 -0,04 -0,04 0,00 0,09 0,02 -0,05 -0,08 0,00 0,11 0,01 0,03 0,07 0,20 -0,05 -0,02 0,11 -0,01 0,01 0,05 0,01 1,00
27 Firm size: large   -0,12 -0,09 -0,04 -0,11 -0,02 0,15 -0,02 -0,05 0,01 -0,04 0,00 0,06 0,00 -0,13 0,04 0,02 0,06 -0,01 -0,01 0,04 -0,04 -0,04 0,05 -0,03 0,01 -0,40 1,00
28 Customer segment -0,08 -0,09 -0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 -0,05 0,04 -0,12 0,11 -0,08 0,00 0,10 -0,15 -0,05 0,01 0,08 0,01 0,05 0,03 0,01 0,03 0,03 0,00 0,03 -0,04 0,16 1,00
29 Additional services -0,20 -0,07 0,01 -0,01 0,06 0,06 -0,06 -0,08 0,01 0,18 -0,01 0,06 0,13 0,04 -0,01 0,08 0,08 0,01 0,07 -0,01 -0,10 -0,15 0,01 0,05 0,00 -0,17 0,09 0,03 1,00
30 Insurance company  -0,02 0,03 0,07 -0,03 -0,03 -0,02 0,01 0,05 -0,02 -0,03 -0,02 0,05 0,00 -0,16 -0,03 0,01 -0,02 -0,06 -0,02 0,06 -0,10 -0,01 -0,04 -0,08 -0,13 -0,08 0,03 0,06 0,09 1,00
31 Insurance line 0,00 0,12 0,00 0,00 0,02 -0,05 0,03 -0,07 0,14 0,11 -0,12 0,03 0,00 0,03 0,08 -0,03 0,12 -0,02 0,04 -0,03 0,05 -0,01 0,00 0,06 0,03 0,05 -0,03 -0,03 0,12 0,00 1,00
32 Customers’ demand: information services -0,08 -0,01 0,03 -0,03 -0,02 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,03 -0,03 -0,02 -0,05 0,03 0,08 0,11 0,20 0,15 0,04 0,11 0,09 0,09 -0,07 0,12 0,20 0,19 -0,03 0,07 0,01 0,04 -0,09 0,01 1,00
33 Customers’ demand: additional services for free -0,04 -0,04 0,05 0,04 0,09 -0,04 0,02 -0,05 0,03 0,06 0,03 0,06 0,01 0,08 0,12 0,15 0,05 0,02 0,06 0,10 0,03 -0,15 0,05 0,12 0,08 -0,03 0,09 -0,06 0,16 0,00 0,07 0,41 1,00
34 Competitive pressure 0,04 -0,02 0,05 0,05 0,04 -0,03 0,09 -0,01 -0,04 -0,14 -0,03 0,21 -0,06 0,16 0,11 0,02 -0,06 -0,11 -0,15 0,11 0,04 -0,03 -0,01 -0,04 -0,07 -0,02 0,06 -0,08 -0,05 0,02 -0,02 0,12 0,17 1,00
35 Insurance company reputation 0,05 0,05 -0,01 0,02 0,04 -0,01 0,04 0,05 0,01 -0,01 0,04 0,05 0,03 -0,03 0,19 0,07 0,10 0,01 0,09 0,11 0,02 -0,07 -0,04 -0,01 -0,05 -0,08 0,00 0,03 -0,03 0,07 0,04 0,12 0,16 0,09 1,00
36 Information content:old-age security in general -0,14 -0,02 0,01 0,04 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,05 -0,06 0,12 -0,07 -0,05 0,18 -0,20 -0,05 0,14 0,09 0,01 0,11 0,12 -0,03 -0,04 -0,01 0,03 -0,02 -0,10 0,09 0,20 0,19 -0,11 0,04 0,10 0,14 -0,10 0,04 1,00
37 Information content:calculation of participation rates0,07 -0,08 0,00 0,09 0,04 0,00 0,03 -0,03 0,08 0,00 -0,02 -0,07 0,06 -0,06 -0,01 0,12 0,09 0,12 0,17 0,06 0,09 -0,01 -0,06 0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,04 0,06 0,00 0,02 -0,02 0,12 0,06 -0,03 0,13 -0,01 1,00
38 Information content: contract design 0,00 -0,03 -0,03 -0,01 -0,05 0,00 -0,16 0,04 -0,03 0,12 -0,04 0,01 0,08 -0,11 0,06 -0,08 0,12 0,08 0,18 0,01 0,02 -0,05 0,03 -0,03 0,09 0,15 -0,20 0,02 0,11 0,13 0,08 -0,09 0,05 -0,04 0,02 0,02 0,04 1,00
39 Information content:personal risk profile and needs-0,09 -0,08 0,03 -0,03 -0,05 0,05 0,01 -0,18 0,06 -0,03 0,06 -0,03 0,14 0,09 0,10 0,13 0,08 -0,01 0,00 0,27 -0,05 -0,12 -0,11 -0,14 -0,17 -0,07 0,04 -0,04 0,13 0,01 -0,01 0,19 0,11 0,20 0,14 0,16 0,04 -0,01 1,00
40 Information content:policy design -0,01 0,11 -0,12 0,14 -0,02 0,04 0,00 0,08 -0,01 0,04 0,06 0,03 0,07 -0,27 -0,10 0,03 0,12 0,15 0,12 0,12 0,13 0,01 0,17 0,05 0,07 -0,06 0,15 -0,01 -0,04 0,06 -0,08 0,01 0,02 -0,08 0,06 -0,14 0,03 -0,09 0,01 1,00
41 Information content:private old-age insurance products 0,12 0,05 0,04 0,01 0,07 -0,08 0,08 0,00 0,10 -0,02 0,05 -0,02 -0,06 -0,02 -0,01 0,14 -0,06 0,12 0,03 0,02 -0,03 0,07 -0,04 -0,09 -0,06 0,13 -0,05 -0,08 -0,10 -0,10 0,03 0,06 0,02 0,03 -0,04 -0,03 0,03 -0,09 0,02 0,00 1,00
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